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Martin Hogg Scotland https://doi.org/10.1515/tortlaw-2020-0024 
A. Legislation 
 
1. Damages (Investment Returns and Periodical Payments)  
(Scotland) Act 2019, asp 4 
 
This statute makes amendments to the Damages Act 1996, adding in new sec-
tions B1, 2B–J, and 4A–B, as well as new subsections to sec 2. The Damages Act 
1996 addressed two main issues: (a) the return to be expected from the invest-
ment of a sum awarded as damages for future pecuniary loss in an action for 
personal injury (such return to be deducted from the amount awarded);1 and 
(b) a power of the courts to award damages for personal injuries wholly or in 
part in the form of periodical payments, as well as ministerial guarantees of 
such payments which were to be made by public bodies. 
The additional provisions added by this new Act include: (a) further rules 
allowing, in some cases, the assumed rate of return from the investment of 
damages to be varied from that specified in rules of court; (b) a power given to 
courts to order periodical damages payments in the absence of the consent of 
the parties to do so; (c) a power given to courts to specify in what form periodi-
cal damages payments are to be made as well as a power to require the payer of 
damages to take specified action to secure continuity of payment; (d) provisions 
allowing, in certain circumstances, for the variation or suspension of both 
agreed and court-ordered periodical damages payments; and (e) restrictions on 
the entitlement to assign a right to receive a specified portion of periodical dam- 
ages payments. 
The right to periodical damages payments in respect of personal injuries, 
rather than simply the receipt of a once-and-for-all damages payment, is a use-




1 This is an important aspect of damages awards. The courts work from a principle that an 
injured party should receive 100% compensation for injuries sustained, no more and no less. 
When assessing losses that will arise in the future, courts are required to take account of the 
fact that, because a damages award can be invested, it is necessary to discount from the 
amount to be awarded the expected rate of return on such an investment. The relevant provisi-
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scheme allowing for damages payments over an extended period of time has 
thrown up complications and contingencies which it was thought sensible to 
address in these new provisions. The specific new rule that periodical payments 
can be ordered by a court without the parties’ mutual consent was implemen- 
ted following public consultation by the Scottish government. The courts in  
England and Wales had already been empowered to impose such an order. 
One interesting comparative feature of the rules relating to the return to be 
expected from the investment of a sum awarded as damages for future pecuni-
ary loss in an action for personal injury is that the discount rate applied in  
England and Wales has recently diverged from that used in Scotland. In  
Scotland, the rate has recently been confirmed as remaining at –0.75%;2 in  
England and Wales, the rate was reduced as of 5 August 2019 to –0.25%. One  
UK law firm, noting this divergence, has commented that:   
 
‘We modelled a hypothetical but realistic case of a 17-year old needing medical care  
costing £ 150,000 pa. The difference in rates would mean, all other things being equal,  
a higher payment of £ 2.6 million in Scotland … The extra costs for insurers in meeting 
these claims could lead to higher insurance premiums in Scotland than in England & 
Wales.’3 
 
It is interesting that the UK Government, in its review of the rate for England 
and Wales, stated that ‘[t]he current rate of minus 0.75% has led to concerns 
that claimants were being substantially over-compensated, increasing financial 
pressure on public services that have large personal injury liabilities, parti- 
cularly the NHS’.4 Evidently neither this nor the possible impact on insurance 
premiums was thought to be of sufficient concern for the Scottish Govern- 
ment. 
The new provisions are mostly not yet in force; they will enter into force on 








2 Government Actuary’s Department, ‘The Personal Injury Discount Rate: Review and deter-
mination of the rate in Scotland by the Government Actuary’, 27 September 2019. 










1. Commodity Solution Services Ltd v First Scottish Searching 
Services Ltd (Sheriff Appeal Court, 4 February 2019, [2019] 
SAC (Civ) 4, 2019 SC (SAH) 41): Whether Professional 
Searcher of Public Register Owed a Duty of Care for 
Financial Losses Caused through Failure to Notify Security 
over Property 
 
a) Brief Summary of the Facts 
 
The pursuers successfully sued a debtor (Mr Gardner), who was the owner of a 
house, obtaining a court order for payment of £ 50,000. As a means to securing 
the sum owed, they registered an inhibition (a legal instrument forbidding the 
sale or other alienation of the house) in the public Register of Inhibitions and 
Adjudications (‘the Register’). In 2012, when Mr Gardner sought to sell the house 
to his son (who knew nothing of the existence of the inhibition), the defenders 
(a company of searchers of public registers) were engaged by the son to carry 
out a search of the Register. Their search failed to disclose the inhibition in 
place over the property. The house was sold to the son, who became the regis-
tered owner of it. As he bought it in good faith and for consideration, the inhibi-
tion ceased to have effect. The pursuers were unable to recover their debt from 
Mr Gardner. They raised an action against the defenders, arguing that the de-
fenders had been negligent in not identifying the inhibition and that this was in 
breach of a duty of care owed to them by the defenders. The defenders argued in 
reply that they owed no duty of care to the pursuers. 
At first instance, the court held that a relationship of proximity existed be-
tween the defenders and the pursuers, that the pursuers’ losses had been fore-
seeable, and that it was fair and reasonable for a duty of care to be imposed on 
the defenders. The sheriff ordered an examination into the amount of the loss 
suffered by the pursuers. The defenders appealed against the decision. 
 
 
b) Judgment of the Court 
 
The Sheriff Appeal Court held: (1) the defenders had assumed a responsibility in 
delict to the class of person who would be affected by the undertaking of their 
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(2) viewed objectively, there was a relationship between creditors who had reg-
istered an inhibition and searchers given the task of finding such inhibitions. 
The fact that, subjectively, the searchers were unaware of that relationship, be-
cause they did not carry out the search with care, did not mean that there was 
no relationship as a matter of law; and (3) as to the fairness and reasonableness 
of imposing a duty of care: there would be little incentive on searchers to carry 
out searches with care if no such duty existed; the liability of the searchers 
could never exceed the value of the property being searched against, whether 
that liability were owed to the purchaser or the inhibiting creditor; and search-
ers were able to insure against the risk, whereas an inhibiting creditor could 
not. It was therefore fair and reasonable for a duty of care to be imposed on the 
defenders. 
In consequence, the appeal court refused the defenders’ appeal, ordering a 
proof before answer (a trial of the facts, before application of the applicable law) 





The judgment concerns one of the most controversial areas of the law of delict, 
namely the imposition of liability for pure economic losses. In this case, the de-
fenders had not been directly engaged by the pursuers, had had no communica-
tion with them, and did not know their identity. In those circumstances, one can 
appreciate why the defenders sought to argue that they were not in a relation-
ship of proximity with the pursuers and should not therefore be held to have 
owed them any duty of care. 
In the most discursive of the three judgments of the appeal bench, Sheriff 
Braid considered Lord Reed’s guidance in determining whether delictual liabil-
ity should be imposed on the facts of any given case (as set out in the 2018 Su-
preme Court case of Robinson v Chief Constable, West Yorkshire Police5). He con-
sidered that this new approach could be broken down into four stages: (1) ask 
whether the case is novel; (2) if it is not, apply established principles; (3) if it is, 
then the nearest analogous case should be looked to for assistance; (4) having 




5 [2018] United Kingdom Supreme Court (UKSC) 4. 
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Sheriff Braid’s analysis that the case was a novel one7 strikes this observer 
as correct: there was an absence of reliance on any specific acts of the defenders 
(albeit that one might say that creditors whose debts are backed by an inhibi-
tion are relying, in a very general sense, on searchers of public registers under-
taking their task properly) as well as an absence of any subjectively understood 
relationship between the parties. There have been a few other cases where reli-
ance on specific acts has been absent (Sheriff Braid notes among them White v 
Jones8), but an absence of both such reliance and of a subjectively understood 
relationship between the parties is where the novelty lies. This made identifying 
the nearest analogous case crucial, as how near the analogy was would be 
highly relevant to whether the proposed extension of liability might be too 
great. 
The nearest analogous case was thought to be Ministry of Housing and Local 
Government v Sharp,9 in which a (falsely stated) clear report of an entry in a pub-
lic register of land charges was given by the registrar, following a negligently 
conducted search by a clerk seconded to the registrar’s office. The result of the 
incorrectly stated position in the register was that the plaintiff lost its right to 
make a claim against a purchaser of land. The question was whether either the 
registrar or the clerk’s employer was liable to the Ministry, the Court of Appeal 
holding that only the clerk (and hence, vicariously, his employer) was liable. In 
the later case of Customs and Excise Commissioners v Barclays Bank,10 Lord 
Mance had said of the Sharp decision that ‘[i]t would be unjust if no compensa-
tion could be obtained for the adverse consequences on property rights of negli-
gence of an official performing such a service in the public interest’.11 
Sheriff Braid’s conclusion was that the Sharp case was sufficiently analo-
gous to warrant an extension of liability, concluding that (1) the searchers in the 
case before him should also be deemed to have assumed a responsibility for the 
task they were undertaking to the pursuers (respondents), and (2) there was, in 
fact, a relationship between them and creditors affected by their search (even 
though they were unaware of it).12 On the persuasiveness of this reasoning 
 
_____ 
7 See para [32]. 
8 [1995] 2 Appeal Cases (AC) 207; [1995] 2 Weekly Law Reports (WLR) 187; [1995] 1 All England 
Reports (All ER) 691. 
9 [1970] 2 Queen’s Bench (QB) 223; [1970] 2 WLR 802; [1970] 1 All ER 1009. 
10 [2006] United Kingdom House of Lords (UKHL) 28; [2007] 1 AC 181; [2006] 3 WLR 1; [2006] 4 
All ER 256. 
11 At para 110. 
12 On the first point, he reasoned that ‘the imposition of a duty of care would maintain the 
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hangs the correctness of the decision reached. Looked at through the lens of 
incrementalism, it may well be that the extension of liability was justified: it 
does not seem a great leap to impose delictual liability on private searchers for 
the carefulness of their search, if such liability has already been imposed on a 
clerk conducting a search for the registrar (Sharp) or on a solicitor for disap-
pointed beneficiaries under an invalid will (White). Where legitimate concern 
may lie is in the very existence of an incremental approach to extending negli-
gence-based liability. While doubtless an approach designed to demonstrate 
that the courts are not being too radical, incrementalism does not guarantee 
that the end result will be liability which is kept within reasonable bounds. A 
starting point which has been developed by, say, ten consecutive incremental 
extensions may lead to an end result which would have been of great concern to 
those surveying the law from the starting point. Without being anchored in 
some principles, rather than just case facts, it is hard to see how an incremental 
approach will ultimately be satisfying. 
This concern was highlighted by one of the appeal bench, Sheriff Principal 
Pyle, at the start of his judgment, when he observed: 
 
‘In an article published in 2009 … Lord Hope of Craighead wrote at length about the con-
siderable contribution to Scots law of the late Prof Bill Wilson … Lord Hope described the 
professor’s lectures on delict and recalled his memorable conclusion on the law of negli-
gence: “There is no real law here, beyond that which is to be found in the actual cases.” 
That was in 1963. It seems to me that little has changed. Indeed, as Lord Hope pointed out 
(p 318), Lord Hoffmann declared 36 years later that no one can pretend that the existing 





bition, on a searcher of the register finding it and reporting its existence to a potential purcha-
ser. Additionally, the appellants could be said to have voluntarily taken on the task of sear-
ching the register (for profit), and, as such, to have assumed responsibility to the class of per-
sons affected by that task, namely, inhibiting creditors whose inhibition were on the register.’ 
[para 45]. On the second point, he argued that ‘viewed objectively, there was in fact a rela-
tionship between creditors who had registered an inhibition, and the searchers tasked with 
finding them. The fact that, subjectively, the searchers were unaware of that relationship, be-
cause they did not carry out the search with care, does not mean that there was no relationship 
as a matter of law … the very function of the search was to discover the existence of inhibiting 
creditors who were there to be found, and having regard to the fact that the appellants volunta-
rily undertook the search, in my view that does give rise to [a] sort of special relationship …’ 
[para 45]. 
13 Para [2]. 
16 
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Sheriff Pyle went on14 to quote directly from Lord Hope’s 2009 article: 
 
‘Nowhere has the influence of the English approach been more keenly felt than in the de-
velopment of the law of negligence. Had its development been left in the hands of Scottish 
jurists it might have been directed to issues of principle. But, as Bill Wilson pointed out  
in his valiant attempts to make sense of the authorities, the English approach has been  
to develop new categories of negligence incrementally and by analogy with established  
cases …This approach leads to decisions which are influenced not by principle but by  
policy.’15 
 
The clear impression is conveyed that, while Sheriff Pyle felt obliged to adopt 
the steer of English law and apply an incremental approach to negligence-based 
liability, it left him with a feeling of unease. That sense of unease is not surpris-
ing: malleable and woolly concepts like assumption of responsibility and prox-
imity, when tied to incrementalism, are immensely challenging for a principled 
exegesis and development of the law. 
 
 
2. Khan v Hussain (Court of Session (Outer House) 8 February 
2019, [2019] CSOH 11, 2019 SC 322): Whether Pursuer’s 
Claim against his Accountant for Financial Losses was 
Barred by the Rule ex turpi causa non oritur actio 
 
a) Brief Summary of the Facts 
 
The pursuer, a provider of financial services regulated by the Financial Services 
Agency (‘FSA’), had disciplinary proceedings brought against him by the FSA. 
He was found to be in breach of financial regulations by having knowingly 
submitted a personal mortgage application containing false and misleading 
information about his income in the form of false payslips and by providing fur-
ther false information when the investigation into his conduct was underway. 
The pursuer’s authority to perform certain functions was withdrawn by the FSA. 
The pursuer subsequently raised an action against the defender, his account-
ant, for breach of contract and professional negligence, claiming his loss of 
earnings resulting from the FSA’s sanction. He argued that the offending pay-
 
_____ 
14 In para [3]. 
15 Quoting from Lord Hope of Craighead, ‘The Strange Habits of the English’, in Stair Society 
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slips had been created by the defender on the defender’s advice and that they 
represented sums the defender had advised the pursuer he was entitled to draw 
down from a company he owned and directed. 
The defender argued in his defence that: (1) as the pursuer had been subject 
to sanctions by the FSA, it would be inconsistent and contrary to public policy 
to allow the pursuer to attempt to pass on the consequences of his own wrong-
doing to the defender: ex turpi causa non oritur actio, and (2) it would have been 
impossible for the pursuer to have insured against the consequences of FSA dis-
ciplinary sanction, and by the same token he should not be permitted to sue in 
negligence or contract in respect thereof. 
 
 
b) Judgment of the Court 
 
The judge (Lord Ericht) dismissed the pursuer’s claim, holding that the ex turpi 
causa rule (that one cannot recover in respect of damage which is the conse-
quence of one’s own criminal act) was not limited in application to the conse-
quences of sentences imposed for criminal acts: it extended to sanctions im-
plied by a regulator. While there might be circumstances in which the policy of 
the ex turpi causa rule had to defer to some other public policy, such circum-
stances could not arise where a person was disciplined for his own dishonest 
conduct. In this case, the pursuer had previously made a dishonest representa-
tion in relation to a mortgage application which pre-dated the production of the 





The significance of the case lies in the court’s clear view that the ex turpi causa 
rule is applicable not just to the results of conduct which have been judged 
criminal by a court of law but equally to the consequences of a finding of dis-
honest conduct by a statutory regulator. Scottish jurisprudence has not thrown 
up many cases on the ex turpi causa rule, but there was plenty of English case 
law on which the judge in this case could rely in reaching his decision. 
A clearly analogous English case was that of Safeway Stores Ltd v Twigger,16 
in which the Office of Fair Trading (OFT) had imposed a regulatory fine on the 
 
_____ 
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claimant for anti-competitive practices. That was held to bar Safeway from mak-
ing a claim in respect of the value of the fine against those employees and direc-
tors responsible for the decision to engage in the practices. Lord Ericht ap-
proved of the remark by Longmore LJ in Safeway that: 
 
‘The rationale of the maxim [ex turpi causa non oritur actio] is the need for the criminal 
courts and the civil courts to speak with a consistent voice. It would be inconsistent for a 
claimant to be criminally and personally liable (or liable to pay penalties to a regulator 
such as the OFT) but for the same claimant to say to a civil court that he is not personally 
answerable for that conduct.’17 
 
Lord Ericht found both the case analogous and the reasoning of Longmore LJ 
persuasive. The decision appears correct and provides useful Scots authority on 
the application of the ex turpi causa rule to the consequences of sanctions ap-
plied by public regulators. 
 
 
3. Sabet v Fife Council and Milne (Court of Session (Outer 
House) 19 March 2019, [2019] CSOH 26, 2019 Scots Law 
Times (SLT) 514): Whether Local Authority Liable for Breach 
of Statutory Duty to Householder for Flood Damage 
 
a) Brief Summary of the Facts 
 
The pursuers’ house was severely damaged by flooding from a river in Fife. The 
pursuers raised an action for damages jointly and severally against (1) the local 
authority (Fife Council), in respect of alleged breach of duties under secs 56 and 
59 of the Flood Risk Management (Scotland) Act 2009 (‘the 2009 Act’), and (2) 
the neighbouring owner of a weir (a kind of low dam) in the river in respect of 
alleged nuisance on his part. The pursuers averred that: (1) the flood would not 
have occurred had the weir not been blocked with accumulated debris; (2) the 
2009 Act imposed duties upon the local authority which were owed to the pur-
suers in the circumstances of the case. A breach of those duties gave rise to a 
private law right of action in favour of the pursuers to recover damages; and 





17 Longmore LJ at para [16]. 
24 
25 
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neighbouring landowner’s fault. It was the duty of the landowner in the use of 
his property, including the weir, to avoid causing damage to neighbouring 
property such as the pursuers’ house. 
The local authority argued in its defence that: (1) the provisions of the 2009 
Act were designed to provide a general power in relation to the management of 
flood risks, were wholly permissive in nature, and were directed to the man-
agement of risks which, but for the provision concerned, would not exist; and 
(2) there was no class of beneficiaries which might be intended to obtain a statu-
tory benefit under the Act. The neighbouring landowner argued that: (1) the 
pursuers had made no relevant averments of fault on his part: the claim, which 
concerned flooding during a period of torrential rainfall, did not allege any 
omission by the second defender from which negligence might be inferred; 
(2) he owed the pursuers no duty to take positive steps to maintain the weir, nor 
remove debris therefrom; and (3) there was no basis in law for a positive duty to 
maintain an artificial structure so as to alter and mitigate against the otherwise 
natural flow of water. 
 
 
b) Judgment of the Court 
 
The judge (Lord Ericht) dismissed the action against the local authority and al-
lowed a proof before answer (a trial of the facts followed by a debate on the ap-
plication of the law to them) in respect of the action against the neighbouring 
landowner. 
In relation to the claim against the local authority, he held that: (1) in enact-
ing sec 56 of the 2009 Act, Parliament had not intended to create a duty en-
forceable by a private individual against a local authority, rather the section 
had created a general administrative power; (2) by contrast, sec 59 of the Act did 
impose a duty on the local authority to carry out works, but the works to be un-
dertaken had to be specified in a schedule (prepared under sec 18 of the 2009 
Act). No such schedule of works had been prepared in relation to the weir, and 
so there could be no breach of any sec 59 duty, whether or not such a breach 
might give rise to a private law clause of action – on which matter the judge ex-
pressed the obiter view that such a duty might be capable of being owed to a 
limited class of people.  
In relation to the claim against the neighbouring landowner, the judge held 
that the pursuers had pled culpa (fault) on the landowner’s part, through his 
alleged failure to maintain the weir (including through removal of accumulated 










The nature of the claim against the neighbouring landowner in nuisance was 
not exceptional and so no discussion of it is offered here. In relation to the pri-
vate law delictual claim for alleged breach of statutory duty by the local author-
ity, there is a lot of Scottish and English jurisprudence considering when such a 
claim might arise. The foundational modern case in the field is the English case 
of X (Minors) v Bedfordshire County Council,18 and the approach it sets out is 
generally of such claims being disallowed, save in a clearly delineated excep-
tional circumstance: 
 
‘The basic proposition is that in the ordinary case a breach of statutory duty does not, by 
itself, give rise to any private law cause of action. However a private law cause of action 
will arise if it can be shown, as a matter of construction of the statute, that the statutory 
duty was imposed for the protection of a limited class of the public and that Parliament  
intended to confer on members of that class a private right of action for breach of the 
duty.’19 
 
Lord Ericht proceeded to examine a few Scottish cases in which the possibility 
of such private law actions against public bodies had been considered, with 
mixed outcomes for the pursuers in those actions. Prior decisions about such 
matters are of very limited assistance however, as the correct result in each case 
will turn on the wording of the specific statute at issue and the class of persons 
to which the pursuer belongs. 
In this case, Lord Ericht did not strictly require to reach a conclusion on 
whether a private law claim might arise against the local authority: given that 
the duty could only be triggered by the narration in a specific statutory form of 
remedial works to be carried out, and that such a form had not existed in rela-
tion to the locus of the flooding, that put an end to the question. However, his 
Lordship’s obiter remarks will be of interest for possible future cases involving 
similar facts. His view was that, were the preconditions for the existence of the 
duty to be fulfilled, ‘then it seems to me that there would be protection for a lim-
ited class, namely the persons who would be protected from flooding if that par-
ticular set of works was completed.’20 This seems a plausible assessment of the 
likelihood that a breach of the sec 59 duty could give rise to a private law claim 
in delict: not only is there no statutory penalty provided for breach of the duty 
 
_____ 
18 [1995] 2 AC 633; [1995] 3 WLR 162; [1995] 3 All ER 353. 
19 Lord Browne-Wilkinson in X v Bedfordshire, [1995] 2 AC at 731. 
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(which, had there been, might have been taken to exclude any private law 
claim), but it seems apparent that those who will be affected by flooding must 
necessarily belong to a class of persons limited by the geographical proximity of 
their properties to the specific source of the flooding. The purpose of the duty is, 
it can be suggested, evidently the protection of those who would suffer from the 
effects of flooding. So, while the decision in this case does not give us an au-
thoritative answer to the question at issue, the musings of Lord Ericht are help-
ful, albeit relatively short given their obiter nature. 
 
 
4. Hughes v Turning Point Scotland (Court of Session (Outer 
House) 17 May 2019, [2019] CSOH 42, 2019 SLT 651): 
Whether a Homelessness Charity Owed a Duty of Care  
in Respect of the Safe Admission to its Facility and 
Treatment of an Alcoholic who Died from a Seizure 
 
a) Brief Summary of the Facts 
 
Turning Point Scotland (the defender) was a charity which operated a facility in 
Glasgow providing a service for people who were homeless or sleeping rough 
and experiencing a crisis, including as a result of addiction to alcohol. In July 
2013, Mr Hughes, a thirty-four year old man with a history of alcoholism, at-
tended the facility, accompanied by his alcohol support worker. Mr Hughes 
wished to be accommodated at the facility and to receive assistance in with-
drawal from alcohol. He had used the service on previous occasions. The initial 
assessment of Mr Hughes was carried out by one of the defender’s project work-
ers. Following the assessment, Mr Hughes was admitted to a bedroom in the 
crisis residential unit of the facility. An attempt was also made to obtain alcohol 
detoxification medication for Mr Hughes, but none could be immediately ob-
tained. Approximately three hours later he was found motionless on the bed 
and soon afterwards pronounced dead. The cause of death was certified as sus-
pected seizure related to alcohol withdrawal. 
Relatives of Mr Hughes raised a claim for damages against the defender un-
der the Damages (Scotland) Act 2011 on the grounds that the defender, and 
separately the project worker (for whose actings the defender was said to be 
vicariously liable), failed to exercise reasonable care in its dealings with and 
treatment of Mr Hughes. In particular, the pursuers argued that: (1) the defender 
(and the project worker) owed a duty of care to not assess or admit someone in 
Mr Hughes’ position to use of its services; (2) failing which, there was a duty to 
33 
34 
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provide a safe system for his admission and treatment. These breaches of duty 
were argued to have caused Mr Hughes’ death. 
The defender argued in its defence that: (1) the duty incumbent on a person 
in the position of the defender was not such as to allow the claim to succeed; 
(2) in any event, the pursuers had not established that the defender’s conduct 
amounted to a breach of the narrow range of duties averred; (3) the pursuers 
had not established, on the balance of probabilities, legal or factual causation; 
and (4) even if there were to be an award of damages, it should be substantially 




b) Judgment of the Court 
 
The judge (Lord Clark) dismissed the claim against the defender, holding that: 
(1) it would not be fair, just or reasonable to impose on the defender the general 
duty to have the safe system contended for by the pursuers; (2) the defender had 
assumed certain responsibilities towards the deceased – to provide its services 
to the deceased, including the provision of a bed, and to request medication and 
to administer it if prescribed – and the deceased had relied upon it undertaking 
these responsibilities; (3) given the extent of the responsibilities assumed, there 
had been no breach of those responsibilities by the deceased; (4) as to causa-
tion, on the balance of probabilities, the cause of death was sudden, unex-
pected death from alcohol misuse, presumed to be due to cardiac arrhythmia, 
and it would be unsafe to conclude that the administration of the prescribed 
medicine which the defender was to have procured would have prevented the 





There were two principal issues at stake in this case: (1) what exactly had the 
defender voluntarily undertaken to do in relation to the deceased, Mr Hughes? 
Ascertaining that would determine the extent of any possible duty of care (and 
its breach) on the defender’s part; and (2) what had been the cause of his death? 
Was it a sudden, unexpected event, or was it a failure to administer timeously 
the prescription medicine which the defender had undertaken to procure and 
administer? A further issue was whether the deceased’s own culpable conduct 
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As to the first question, the judge undertook a general survey of the various 
authorities relating to the imposition of a duty of care in delict, focusing on 
those cases dealing with an assumption of responsibility. In relation to the pur-
suers’ arguments that there had not been in place a proper system for assessing 
someone in Mr Hughes’ position (a system that would have refused to see him 
admitted, and instead referred to a hospital as an in-patient), the judge thought 
this was a novel case: the other authorities relating to such a systems issue re-
lated to medical providers (such as hospitals) and so were not analogous to the 
work of a charity. Those sorts of medical provider had resources to which the 
defender did not have access. This led the judge to conclude that the imposition 
of a duty concerning an adequate system of the sort contended for would not be 
fair, just, and reasonable. This seems a reasonable conclusion in the circum-
stances. 
As to the second duty of care point – concerning the extent of the responsi-
bilities which were assumed by the defender – the judge’s conclusion again 
seems reasonable on the facts. The defenders were not running an intensive 
care system, offering round the clock, close medical supervision of the sick. A 
member of staff had looked in on the deceased several times during the three 
hours in which he was at the facility. To have expected uninterrupted bedside 
care would have exceeded what the defender had held out it was able to pro-
vide. As the judge (correctly it is suggested) summed up matters: 
 
‘the defender did not assume responsibility for the welfare of Mr Hughes as a generality. It 
did not have control over Mr Hughes in the same manner as a hospital. The defender sim-
ply did not have medical and nursing staff of various ranks and roles, and medication, to 
be taken as having held itself out to provide a safe and comfortable detox.’21 
 
Given the extent of the duties assumed, it is not surprising that, on the evi-
dence, the judge held there to have been no breach of these duties. The judge 
found that ‘on the evidence Mr Hughes was not at material risk of the effects of 
alcohol withdrawal in the limited period after his admission’.22 There had there-
fore been no need to call an ambulance, and it had been reasonable to seek to 
obtain a prescription from a doctor through attempts to telephone him. 
As to the questions of causation and contributory negligence, the first ques-
tion was whether earlier administration of the medicine being sought (diaze-
pam) would have prevented the death. The conclusion of the judge on this point 
 
_____ 
21 Para [98]. 
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need not be examined further: he held that, on the balance of probabilities, the 
cause of death had been cardiac arrythmia, and that, because diazepam is not 
prescribed to prevent cardiac arrythmia, it would not be safe to conclude that 
earlier administration of the drug would have prevented the death. This seems a 
reasonable assessment. 
The finding of contributory negligence (the judge holding that, had the de-
fender been in breach of its duty, the court would have held the deceased to 
have been 60% contributorily negligent) requires a little more examination. To 
be applicable, a finding of contributory negligence requires a demonstration 
that specific conduct of an injured party was both blameworthy and a cause of 
the party’s injuries. The judge’s conclusion that the conduct of Mr Hughes had 
been blameworthy seems to have emerged from judicial observations that: 
 
‘It was absolutely clear on the evidence that Mr Hughes knew his alcohol consumption to 
be harmful. He had been admitted to hospital as a result of his alcohol misuse on numer-
ous previous occasions. The evidence of his two sisters supported the view that he was 
aware of the problems his alcoholism was causing … His condition as a result of his alco-
hol consumption was closely connected in time and place, and indeed intermixed with, 
the allegedly negligent conduct of the defender.’23 
 
There is a somewhat mixed message conveyed in these remarks: to begin with, 
it seems as if it is being suggested that it is his dependency on alcohol in general 
(his alcoholism) which was a blameworthy cause of Mr Hughes’ death. How-
ever, the latter portion of the quoted remarks (referring to his condition as a re-
sult of his alcohol consumption) focuses more on the specific state of drunken-
ness he was in at the time of his admission.24 It would have been preferable to 
have had absolute clarity on what conduct was being assessed as blameworthy. 
It is quite a different (and probably more controversial) thing to suggest that a 
pre-existing medical condition (alcohol dependency) can be a blameworthy 
cause of someone’s death; on the other hand, saying that a state of drunkenness 
on a specific occasion constituted contributory negligence would be a more run-
of-the-mill finding, though had this issue been a live one in this judgment, one 
would have expected to have seen more discussion of how a specific level of 
blood alcohol can causally contribute to a fatal incident of arrythmia. 
 
_____ 
23 Para [115].  
24 When admitted to the facility, Mr Hughes had a blood alcohol measurement of 0.15 (a state 
of very obvious drunkenness). At this level, symptoms include severe impairment to judgment, 
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5. C v Chief Constable of the Police Service of Scotland (Court 
of Session (Outer House) 28 June 2019, [2019] CSOH 48, 
2019 SLT 875): Whether a Common Law Right to Privacy 
Exists in Scots Law 
 
a) Brief Summary of the Facts 
 
The petitioners were ten individual police officers against whom misconduct 
proceedings had been brought under the Police Service of Scotland (Conduct) 
Regulations 2014. The respondents were the Chief Constable and Deputy Chief 
Constable of the Police Service of Scotland and a Chief Superintendent of Police 
appointed under the 2014 Regulations to conduct the misconduct proceedings. 
The misconduct proceedings related to messages shared by the petitioners 
using the electronic WhatsApp messaging system which were sexist, racist, 
anti-semitic, homophobic, and mocking of disability in nature. The petitioners 
sought (1) an order declaring that the use of those messages by Police Scotland 
for the purpose of misconduct proceedings in respect of alleged non-criminal 
behaviour was both a breach of a common law right to privacy (and therefore 
actionable in delict) and incompatible with the petitioners’ right to respect for 
their private and family life under art 8 of the European Convention on Human 
Rights (ECHR); and (2) an interdict preventing the respondents from conducting 
or maintaining any misconduct proceedings against the petitioners on the basis 
of, or involving the use of, the messages. 
 
 
b) Judgment of the Court 
 
The judge (Lord Bannatyne) held that: (1) In English law, the tort of breach of 
confidence had developed into a tort of misuse of private information, Conven-
tion rights having been used to develop the common law in this way;25 (2) this 
developmental approach should find favour in the Scottish courts. Adopting the 
same approach, it should therefore be affirmed that there was a right to privacy 
at common law in Scotland. The right was ‘a core value and one which is inher-
ent in a democratic and civilised state’;26 (3) what limited case law there was in 
Scottish jurisprudence also supported the affirmation of such a right to pri-
 
_____ 
25 Para [113]. 
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vacy;27 (4) the use of the WhatsApp messaging service by a member of the public 
would give rise to a reasonable expectation of privacy in relation to the mes-
sages shared on the app;28 (5) however, in order to maintain confidence by the 
public in the impartial discharge of their duties, police officers necessarily con-
sent to limitations on their right to privacy consistent with the maintenance of 
such public confidence;29 (6) the attributes of the petitioners (as police consta-
bles) was one of the circumstances to which the courts could have regard in 
considering the reasonable expectation of privacy;30 (7) the content of the mes-
sages in question could be regarded as potentially informing the issue of breach 
of standards in circumstances calling into question the impartial discharge of 
the petitioners’ duties. The petitioners in these circumstances had no reason-
able expectation of privacy;31 and (8) therefore no right of privacy had existed in 
the circumstances, either at common law or under art 8 ECHR.32 Given these 





There have been arguments for some time that Scots law ought to recognise the 
existence of a right to privacy, the breach of which would be actionable as a 
delict.33 Such arguments have drawn on the ECHR, but not exclusively, and any 
such common law right would have an existence separate to a right deriving 
from the ECHR. The Scottish courts have, however, been slow to recognise such 
a right, having instead relied upon the more limited right to confidentiality (tra-
ditionally resting upon an alleged relationship and duty of confidentiality be-
tween the relevant parties). 
As discussed by the judge in this case, the duty of confidentiality has been 
developed beyond its original boundaries by the courts in England and Wales. 
Thus, in Campbell v MGN,34 Lord Nicholls remarked that respect for individual 
 
_____ 
27 Para [118] f. 
28 Para [150]. 
29 Para [164]. 
30 Para [166]. 
31 Para [167]. 
32 Para [173]. 
33 See, for instance, M Hogg, Privacy: A valuable and protected interest in Scots law, 1992 SLT 
(News) 349; M Hogg, The Very Private Life of the Right to Privacy, 1994 3(3) Hume Papers on 
Public Policy 1. 
34 [2004] UKHL 22; [2004] 2 AC 457. 
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privacy ‘lies at the heart of liberty in a modern state. A proper degree of privacy 
is essential for the well-being and development of an individual’,35 though tem-
pering that remark with the further observation that ‘[i]n this country, unlike 
the United States of America, there is no over-arching, all-embracing cause of 
action for “invasion of privacy”’.36 This further comparative observation was 
perhaps intended as relevant to the appropriate scope of any English action: 
rather than a ‘right to privacy’, Lord Nicholls preferred characterising the devel-
opments of the English law as giving rise to a tort of ‘misuse of private informa-
tion’.37 It is interesting that, in this judgment, Lord Bannatyne does not seem to 
share possible concerns about the adoption of an expansive nomenclature: he 
describes Scots law as recognising a ‘right to privacy’, with (one presumes) the 
relevant delictual description being a delict of breach (or invasion) of privacy. 
He does not specifically limit the right to private information. 
The full details of this newly recognised delict of breach of privacy are not 
explored in this judgment – for instance, we do not know whether the new ac-
tion has simply acquired all of the defences of the old action for breach of confi-
dence, or whether further new defences might conceivably be appropriate. 
However, from the facts and decision of this case, we do know that whether a 
right to privacy exists is contextual, and that part of that context is the ‘attrib-
utes’ of the party petitioning for a declaration that its right to privacy has been 
breached. Such attributes include whether the petitioner holds a public office, a 
police constable being such an office, and whether the conduct disclosed in an 
alleged breach of privacy is relevant to the discharge of the duties of that public 
office. That seems entirely appropriate, for the public policy reasons discussed 
by the judge, and justifies the judge’s ruling on the petitioners’ case. 
It will be important to observe how the new common law right to privacy 
develops in subsequent decisions of the courts. The existence of the right is very 
unlikely to be challenged by higher courts, but its application to aspects of pri-









35 Para [12]. 
36 Para [11]. 
37 Lord Nicholls, Campbell, at para [14]. 
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6. Ardmair Bay Holdings Ltd v James Craig (Court of Session 
(Outer House) 31 July 2019, [2019] CSOH 58, 2019 SLT 1011): 
Whether a Statement of Opinion Amounts to an Actionable 
Misrepresentation 
 
a) Brief Summary of the Facts 
 
The pursuer entered into an agreement with the defender and others to buy the 
whole share capital of Craig Group Ltd (‘the company’) for approximately £82 
million. The defender was the chairman of, and a substantial shareholder in, 
the company. On the eve of the signing of the agreement, one of the subsidiary 
companies of the company (‘North Star’) received an email (with an invitation to 
treat [ITT] attached) from a client relating to North Star’s two most lucrative con-
tracts. The communication indicated that the client might not exercise options 
to extend the contracts on the same terms. The defender did not disclose either 
the receipt of the email or the terms of the ITT to the pursuer at that time. The 
agreement was signed the next day. 
A few months later, when the contracts to which the ITT related were not 
extended, the pursuer became aware of the email and its timing, as well as the 
contents of the ITT. The pursuer raised an action alleging that the defender had 
(1) breached a number of warranties in the agreement, and/or (2) engaged in 
wilful concealment of a material matter, or (3) failed to correct a representation 
made prior to conclusion of the agreement (concerning the defender’s expecta-
tion about certain financial matters continuing to prevail because the options to 
extend the contracts would be exercised) when that representation became un-
true (as the pursuer contended it had) upon North Star’s receipt of the ITT. As a 
consequence, the pursuer alleged it had sustained a loss in the form of paying 
substantially more than it otherwise would have for the shares in the company 
(estimating its loss at about £ 16,800,000). The defender denied all of the 
grounds of liability and advanced alternative interpretations of the warranties. 
In respect of the claims based on the agreement, the defender also relied on an 
‘entire agreement clause’ in the agreement, which specified that the agreement 
comprehensively defined the parties’ rights (and therefore excluded any claims 
not deriving from those rights, including any based in delict). 
 
 
b) Judgment of the Court 
 
The judge (Lady Wolffe) held that: (1) the defender had been in breach of the 




Scotland | 561 
 
below); (2) the alleged misrepresentation amounted to no more than a state-
ment of opinion by the defender and did not have the necessary actionable 
quality of a statement or representation of fact; and (3) the arguments on wilful 
concealment were closely related to, if not dependent on, those advanced in 
respect of the misrepresentation case and, given the conclusion on the latter, 
the case on wilful concealment was also bound to fail. As a result of these find-
ings, the judge dismissed the claim in so far as based in delict but allowed it in 





The delictual relevance of this case lies in its analysis of what sort of statement 
can amount to an actionable misrepresentation, and whether a representation 
needs to be corrected if and when the information it conveys no longer holds 
good.  
In this case, the pursuers (the buyers of the company) had asked about day 
rates for certain vessels which were operated by the subsidiary company, North 
Star, framing their request as one for the management team’s ‘expectation and 
rationale’ for the day rates of those assets. The reply was to the effect that, as 
the vessels had been specifically built to meet the tonnage requirements of the 
subsidiary company’s client, ‘we believe that the … vessels are the only ves- 
sels capable of meeting this specific requirement. As such the rate expecta-
tions would be in line with the projected expectations’.38 The judge in this case 
emphasised the terminology used in this statement, noting the use of the words 
‘believe’, ‘expectation’, and ‘projected expectation’, concluding that this was a 
statement of opinion and not a statement or representation of fact. Given the 
language used, this seems a reasonable assessment of the nature of the state-
ment. She further noted that, when the email (and ITT) were received, the result 
of what was conveyed meant that the factual statement underpinning the ra-
tionale (that the vessels were bespoke vessels commissioned to meet the client’s 
needs) continued to be correct; all that was affected was the certainty of the 
stated expectation. 
This finding was a crucial one because in Scots law (as in English law), 
statements of opinion cannot ground a claim for misrepresentation. However, 
the cases exempting mere opinions from liability require an important caveat to 
be borne in mind: the English courts have held that, in tort law, ‘any opinion 
 
_____ 
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given carries with it a representation that the maker of the statement has some 
genuine factual basis for the formation of that opinion’39; where such genuine 
factual basis is absent, then the statement may be actionable. Putting it another 
way, the courts have said that, when making a statement of belief, the maker is 
required to be honest. A belief stated in good faith is deemed to be honestly 
made.40 If, in addition to this, one also bears in mind that, where a representa-
tion ceases to be accurate because circumstances have changed since its mak-
ing, there can be a duty to correct the statement made, then the assessment of 
the purser’s misrepresentation claim in this case might be somewhat more com-
plicated than simply categorising it as an opinion and ipso facto discounting it. 
If the defender’s statement was, when issued, made honestly/in good faith, the 
subsequent notification by the client that the subsidiary company’s contracts 
might not be renewed could arguably mean that the statement could no longer 
continue to be asserted honestly/in good faith. On this point then, perhaps the 
matter was more complex than suggested by the judge.  
Despite the above observations, given the judge’s further conclusion that 
the entire agreement clause excluded any possible liability for misrepresenta-
tion, the outcome would still have been as the judge decided even had the 
statement of opinion conceivably been actionable in theory (because an honest 
belief in its truth could no longer be maintained).  
 
 
7. Whitehouse v Chief Constable, Police Scotland (Court of 
Session (Inner House) 30 October 2019, [2019] CSIH 52, 
2019 SLT 1269): Whether the Lord Advocate was Immune 
from Civil Suit in Relation to an Alleged Wrongful 
Detention41 
 
a) Brief Summary of the Facts 
 
The pursuer, an administrator of a Scottish football club, had twice been ar-
rested and detained overnight by police investigating his alleged participation 
 
_____ 
39 Longmore J, in Credit Lyonnais Bank Nederland v Export Credit Guarantee Department 
[1996] 1 Lloyd’s Reports 200 at 216. 
40 See Economides v Commercial Assurance Co plc [1997] QB 587. 
41 The background facts to this case are as related in the 2018 Yearbook, which discussed an 
earlier stage of this litigation. 
57 
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in a fraudulent scheme and an attempt to pervert the course of justice. Some 
time later, when the Crown announced that no charges were to be brought, the 
pursuer raised an action against (i) the Chief Constable of Police Scotland, 
(ii) the Procurator Fiscal for Specialist Casework in the Crown Office, and 
(iii) the Lord Advocate, seeking damages in respect of the alleged wrongful de-
tention of the pursuer. At first instance,42 the judge held that: (1) the Lord Advo-
cate enjoyed a common law immunity against civil suits, hence the common law 
claims against him were dismissed; and (2) a proof before answer (a trial of the 
facts, before a determination of the law) would be allowed in relation to the 
claim against the Chief Constable. 
The pursuer reclaimed (appealed) to the Inner House of the Court of Ses-
sion, arguing that: (1) Hester v Macdonald,43 the precedent holding that the Lord 
Advocate was immune at common law from civil suits, had been incorrectly 
decided; (2) even if that precedent had been correctly decided, (i) it did not ap-
ply to acts which were malicious and without probable cause, damages being 
available for such acts, and (ii) it should be overruled on the basis that the pol-
icy considerations which existed at the time of the decision were no longer ap-
plicable in the modern era. 
 
 
b) Judgment of the Court 
 
The appeal bench held that: (1) Hester v Macdonald had been wrongly decided 
and should be overruled; and (2) in relation to his acts, the Lord Advocate and 
those for whom he was responsible were generally subject to the same rights 
and duties as other public officials in the conduct of their duties. Where there 
was proof of malice and lack of probable cause in relation to the general acts of 
a public official, the matter was actionable. In consequence, the appeal bench 





This decision of the Inner House is a significant one, as it opens up the possibil-
ity of the Lord Advocate – the Crown officer with ultimate responsibility for all 
criminal prosecutions in Scotland – being open to a civil claim for damages in 
 
_____ 
42 [2018] CSOH 93. 
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delict. Such a momentous decision clearly has far-reaching potential, so it is 
unsurprising that the Inner House decision was delivered by an appeal bench of 
five judges (rather than the standard three) and stretches to 156 paragraphs. 
Why did the appeal bench think that the law had taken a wrong turn in Hes-
ter in declaring the Lord Advocate absolutely immune from civil suit? They 
pointed out that, prior to Hester, there had been no immunity for the Lord Ad-
vocate in the event of a malicious prosecution: as the Lord President put it, the 
Lord Advocate would have been ‘liable, vicariously or otherwise, for a solemn 
prosecution carried out maliciously and without probable case’.44 Reviewing the 
prior authorities, the appeal bench concluded that the step taken to create a 
blanket immunity in Hester was not supported by those authorities. The appeal 
bench therefore chose to restore the view of the law pre-Hester that, as stated 
above, where there is both proof of malice and a lack of probable cause in rela-
tion to the general acts of a public official, the matter is actionable.45 
The Lord President adds that, even had it not been his view that the prior 
position should be restored because Hester was wrongly decided, a comparative 
survey of the position adopted in other legal systems (he mentions England and 
Wales, Canada, Australia, and Continental Europe), ‘[t]he balance, especially in 
regimes in which expenses may be awarded and caution [ie security] required, 
favours redressing the wrongs of dishonest officials, even if there may be rare 
cases in which unfounded actions are sought to be pursued’.46 He concludes 
that, even if Hester had not been wrongly decided, ‘it would have been over-
ruled on the basis that public policy no longer supported its continued applica-
tion’.47 
The immediate consequence of the appeal court’s decision was that, the 
blanket immunity having been swept away, it was therefore possible for a proof 
before answer to be ordered by the court to assess whether any claim against 
the Lord Advocate for wrongful detention based on malice and lack of probable 
cause could be demonstrated. Proof of that looks unlikely on the facts, but we 
shall have to await the outcome of the courts’ further deliberations for confirma-




44 Para [76]. 
45 Para [90]. The Lord President adds that ‘[i]n defamation claims, however, there is an excep-
tion, whereby, as with all legal representatives and the judge, there is absolute privilege for 
things said or done in court.’ 
46 Para [110]. 
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8. Personal Injury 
 
As in other years, the reported personal injury cases are mostly a mixture of 
road traffic accidents, injuries sustained in the workplace48 or in the course of 
employment,49 defective products,50 and medical malpractice.51 
Cases worthy of note include the following. In Fairley v Edinburgh Trams 
Ltd,52 two cyclists who had fallen off their bikes and suffered injuries when 
crossing tram tracks in Edinburgh alleged that their injuries were the result of 
the faulty design of the tracks. As the claims followed media reports that a 
number of cyclists had been complaining about the design of several sections of 
the Edinburgh tram tracks, the case generated a degree of local public interest. 
The cyclists were successful in their claims, the court holding that the road lay-
out and tram tracks at each location had posed a relevant hazard to each of the 
pursuers, one which would not have been obvious to either cyclist. 
In McLean v Fairfield Shipbuilding Ltd,53 relatives of a man who had died 
from a mesothelioma of the pleura argued that they were entitled to a jury 
trial.54 The defenders opposed this, arguing that such entitlement was precluded 
by the Prescription and Limitation (Scotland) Act 1973. The court held that, on a 
proper reading of the Act, the claim of an entitlement to a jury trial was a valid 
one. 
A noteworthy case in relation to claims for psychiatric loss was the Sheriff 
Court decision in Weddle v Glasgow City Council.55 The facts of the case arose out 
of a tragic incident in Glasgow, when the driver of a local authority refuse col-
lection vehicle had blacked out at the wheel, this resulting in the deaths of a 
number of pedestrians. The claim in this case was raised by a passer-by present 
 
_____ 
48 See Dehenes v T Bourne and Son 2019 Scots Law Times, Sheriff Court Reports SLT (Sh Ct) 
219. 
49 Including a claim for damages for psychiatric harm by a former police officer against her 
Chief Constable: see K v House, Chief of the Police Service of Scotland [2019] CSOH 9. 
50 See Hasting v Finsbury Orthopaedics Ltd 2019 SLT 1411 (alleged defective hip replacement). 
51 See, for instance, Sparks v Western Isles National Health Service [2019] Sheriff Court Edin-
burgh (SC Edin) 70 (alleged failure to diagnose and treat gangrene, resulting in amputation of a 
toe). 
52 [2019] CSOH 50. 
53 [2019] CSOH 33. 
54 Jury trials are often favoured by pursuers in those types of personal injury action where 
their use is permitted, out of a belief that juries tend to be more favourable to injured parties in 
relation to the quantum of damages.  
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near the scene of the accident who went on to suffer psychiatric harm as a result 
of her trauma. Her argument was that she should be treated as a so-called ‘pri-
mary victim’ and therefore entitled to claim damages for psychiatric harm with-
out the need to demonstrate (as ‘secondary victims’ do) a close relationship 
with a primary victim of the accident. The judge held that no duty of care had 
been owed to her by the driver: because of her distance from the events, she had 
not been at risk of physical injury; she had only been aware of a relatively small 
road accident between the refuse collection vehicle and a taxi; she had not seen 
any pedestrian being injured; and thus any belief on her part that she was in 
danger was unreasonable. All of that being the case, she was not owed a duty of 
care in relation to the incident. 
Finally, Andrews v Greater Glasgow Health Board56 raised the question of the 
standard of care owed by a junior doctor, and whether his alleged misdiagnosis 
had made a material contribution to the death of a patient (whose relatives ar-
gued that she would have survived had she been properly diagnosed and treated 
at the relevant time). The defenders (the doctor’s employers) argued that the jun-
ior doctor had discharged his duty of care by seeking advice from a more senior 
colleague, and that, even had he been negligent, it could not be demonstrated 
that, with timely and proper treatment, the patient would have survived. The 
court held that: (1) the junior doctor had been negligent and that he was required 
to demonstrate the same standard of care as a more senior doctor; and (2) it was 
probable that had the patient been properly diagnosed and admitted to hospital 
earlier, her suspected condition would have been monitored and her life could 
have been saved. Junior doctors will wish to take note that they cannot escape  





1. Eleanor Russell, The bystander and the bin lorry: Weddle  
v Glasgow City Council considered, 2019 Scots Law Times 
(News) 117–125 
 
In this article, the author analyses the case of Weddle v Glasgow City Council.57 
The author observes that it was perhaps unsurprising that the pursuer had tried 
 
_____ 
56 2019 CSOH 21. 
57 2019 SLT (Sh Ct) 206, discussed earlier at 62. 
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to present her position as having been that of a primary victim in relation to the 
injuries caused when the driver of the local authority refuse collection vehicle 
blacked out at the wheel: given that the pursuer had no connection to any of 
those who were physically injured or killed, she was unable to argue that she 
was a secondary victim entitled to be compensated for the psychiatric injuries 
she had suffered. In Scots (and English) law, a pursuer may qualify as a secon-
dary victim (and hence may recover for psychiatric harm) only if one of a very 
limited class of person (spouse, parent, child, etc) having a close tie of love and 
affection with a primary victim. As that avenue was not open to her, she had 
tried to argue that she had primary victim status. The author agrees with the 
court’s findings on this point: because she had not been sufficiently close to the 
locus of the accident, she could not reasonably have feared for her own safety 
and hence was not entitled to qualify as a primary victim. 
 
 
2. Elspeth Reid, C v Chief Constable of the Police Service of 
Scotland: the right to privacy affirmed, 2019 Scots Law 
Times (News) 137–140 
 
In this article, the author analyses the case of C v Chief Constable of the Police 
Service of Scotland, discussed above.58 The author welcomes the fact that the 
decision has confirmed that a right of privacy exists in Scots law, though adds 
the caveat that this declaration was ‘in the context of misuse of private informa-
tion’.59 The author’s interpretation of the decision is that the recognition af-
forded to the right of privacy in the judge was confined to this specific context. 
The author offers a cautious interpretation of the decision. In English law, 
to be sure, Lord Nicholls characterised the emerging tort as one of misuse of 
private information. However, as was observed earlier, in C the Scottish judge 
preferred to describe Scots law as recognising a ‘right to privacy’ and not merely 
a right to the privacy of private information. So, while the context of C was in-
deed informational, there does not seem to be any clear barrier in the judgment 
to applying the newly recognised right to privacy to non-informational forms of 
privacy (eg physical forms of privacy). True, as the author suggests, we do not 
yet know how the new Scottish delict will develop, but there seems to be no rea-
son in principle why a conceptual barrier should be erected between informa-
tional privacy and other sorts of privacy. 
 
_____ 
58 [2019] CSOH 48, 2019 SLT 875. See above at 38 f. 
59 At 138. 
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3. George Dick, A Reappraisal of Solicitors’ Liabilities to 
Opposing Parties and the (Further) Retreat from Caparo: 
Steel and Another v NRAM Ltd, (2019) 23(2) Edinburgh Law 
Review 247–253 
 
The decision of the United Kingdom Supreme Court in Steel and another v NRAM 
Ltd was considered in the 2018 Yearbook.60 The case concerned the liability of  
a solicitor in pure economic loss for statements relied upon by a third party 
(someone other than her client). The Supreme Court held that she was not li-
able, no duty of care for the statement having been owed to the third party. In 
this article, the author writes in favour of the Supreme Court’s decision, arguing 
that an experienced lender such as NRAM should have been prudent enough to 
have checked its records, to which it had had immediate access, rather than 
relying on the statement of a party who was not its legal adviser. 
The author also argues that the decision marks a ‘further distancing of  
the Supreme Court from the tripartite test in Caparo’,61 that distancing having 
begun in Michael v Chief Constable of South Wales62 when the court expres- 
sed the view that Caparo did not mean to lay down a tripartite test requiring  
(i) foreseeability, (ii) proximity, and (iii) fairness, justice, and reasonableness as 
necessary elements for the establishment of a duty of care in all cases. In the 
author’s opinion, Steel has reinforced the view that the assumption of responsi-
bility test established in the Hedley Byrne63 case is the governing test in cases of 
pure economic loss. 
The author’s analysis provides a helpful summary of developments in this 
area. It seems likely, however, that recent developments in relation to the 
proper approach to establishing liability in negligence cases represent unfin-
ished business, and there may well be further judicial developments in this area 





60 [2018] UKSC 13; 2018 SC (UKSC) 141; 2018 SLT 835; [2018] 3 All ER 81; [2018] 1 Weekly Law 
Reports (WLR) 1190. Discussed in M Hogg, Scotland, in: E Karner/BC Steininger (eds), European  
Tort Law 2018 (2019) 563, nos 7–13. 
61 At 251. Caparo Industries plc v Dickman [1990] 2 AC 605; [1990] 2 WLR 358; [1990] 1 All ER 
568. 
62 [2015] UKSC 2; [2015] AC 1732; [2015] 2 WLR 343; [2015] 2 All ER 65. 
63 Hedley Byrne & Co Ltd v Heller & Partners Ltd [1964] AC 465; [1963] 3 WLR 101; [1963] 2 All 
ER 575. 
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